Cultivar_34_en-GB

No. 34 The future of the Common Agricultural Policy 52 ANALYSIS AND PROSPECTIVE STUDIES CULTIVAR Portugal thrives in a balanced Europe, not in a centralised Europe. But it will thrive even more if it is able to combine this defence of European balance with a renewed internal ambition to strengthen the foundations of its real economy, enhance the value of its territories, promote business and institutional alliances, and develop its own mechanisms for investment and competitiveness. A fair European strategy is an indispensable element. A demanding and mobilising national strategy is the complementary condition without which Portugal risks falling by the wayside. Conclusions: The political paradox of the centralisation strategy The strength of the European Union lies, first and foremost, in the effective functioning of its internal market, which is the Union's main source of external influence, not only as an economic area, but also as an instrument of economic and political affirmation. Today, in a context of intense competition with the US and China, this reality not only remains valid, but Europe also has room to strengthen it. This is the way to increase its global geopolitical weight, not so much through a partial imitation of the American or Chinese models, but by deepening its own advantages. A more integrated, less bureaucratic economy, with greater fluidity in services, a completed banking union, a functional capital market and the ability to sign international agreements without depending on The proposal for a new European budgetary architecture creates a central paradox: by seeking to strengthen the internal market through greater centralisation, the Union risks undermining the political and territorial balances that have underpinned its legitimacy and thus compromise the very functioning of the internal market it seeks to strengthen. The proposal for a new European budgetary architecture creates a central paradox: by seeking to strengthen the internal maertkthrough greater centralisation, the Union risks underminnig the poltical and territorial balancesthat have underpinned its legitimacyand thus compromise the very functioning of the internal market it seeks to strengthen. Washington or Beijing. Paradoxically, these elements, recognised in the Draghi Report's diagnosis, have been sidelined in favour of a vision of asymmetric reindustrialisation that is unlikely to produce balanced results. In the proposed model, the Commission accumulates the roles of financier The reduction of the role of both States and regions in policy design, combined with the weakening, or even a first attempt at renationalisation of the CAP and Cohesion Policy, means that economic liberalisation is no longer inclusive and that the internal market loses its ability to compensate for territorial inequalities, becoming more vulnerable to distribution tensions, evaluator and executor, while Member States and regions cease to be co-creators of policies and the European Parliament sees its actual role limited. However, there is room to correct the course. The long negotiation period for the 2028–2034 MFF allows colegislators to rebalance priorities: strengthening the CAP, restoring a genuine pillar of rural development and economic nationalism and democratic disaffection. In the case of the CAP, it also devalues an area that is vital for internal resilience and for European security and defence strategies. The European ambitiorenquires solidity in internal policyT. he balance between the Europe of Law, the Europe of Communities and the Europe of Sovereignties has been, from the outset, whatmade it possible to reconcile economic, territorial and institutional diversity. introducing thematic or regional windows in centralised instruments, such as the European Competitiveness Fund - for example, a line dedicated to water resilience that aligns competitiveness with territorial cohesion.

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