Europe's three pillars: towards a new strategic (im)balance 49 towards strategic centralisation within the European Union. In order to respond to external threats and strengthen sectors considered critical to security and competitiveness, the EU has greatly relaxed the rules on public funding and state intervention. This response took the form of extending the scope for State aid7, creating centralised industrial instruments and strengthening European programmes for defence and the mobilisation of common financial resources. However, this flexibility, although justifiable in view of the geopolitical situation, has an asymmetrical effect that inevitably favours countries with greater fiscal capacity, causing concern among smaller, peripheral Member States or with a smaller budgetary margin. We can see that the EU is taking on executive functions and economic intervention capabilities never before The result is a scenario in which the legitimate pursuit of European strategic autonomy risks accentuating internal inequalities and weakening territorial cohesion, precisely the opposite of what the European project has always sought to ensure. 5. The proposal for the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF 2028-2034) 8: the new geographyof the European budget, a Strategic Centralisation The trajectory of European integration over the last fifteen years has been marked by a consistent phenomenon in which the response to crises has reinforced the institutional and financial centralisation of the Union. The Commission's proposal for the MFF 2028– 2034 stems from the strategic orientation presented in the Communication A Competitiveness Compass for the seen in its history, with a profoundly "integrative" aim. However, this leap carries with it a risk of structural imbalance, since rapid centralisation and asymmetric flexibilisation can erode the balance that has always underpinned the legitimacy of the integration process. We note that the EU is assuming executive functions and economic intervention capabilities never in its history, with a profoundly ‘integrative’ aim. However, this leap forward brings with it a risk of structural imbalance... EU, launched by Ursula von der Leyen, inspired by Draghi's diagnosis (2024) and the proposals of Bruegel's Blueprint 37 (2025). The core of this approach consists of creating a strong budgetary capacity, concentrated at the European level (a logic of approximation to fiscal The discourse of "European sovereignty" itself, although politically mobilising, reinforced this dynamic by promoting an increased concentration of regulatory power, facilitating selective exceptions to competition rules and favouring the formation or strengthening of national or regional "industrial champions". This movement, in turn, tends to concentrate public and private investment territorially, reducing the capacity for full participation of Member States with less fiscal or industrial muscle. federalism) and intended to finance industrial, technological and defence megaprojects. The ambition, advocated by many, is to address Europe's loss of competitiveness vis-à-vis the United States (an economy sustained by strong internal asymmetries and a robust capital market) and China (whose industrial machine often operates under undemocratic command structures and centralised state power instruments). 7 State aid has begun to cause some concern on the part of the European Court of Auditors, with its generalisation from 2024 onwards: https:// www.eca.europa.eu/pt/publications/sr-2024-21 8 The EU budget for 2028-2034 for a stronger Europe: https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/eu-budget/long-term-eu-budget/eu-budget-2028-2034_en
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